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Abstract
This paper presents the Userspace Integrity Mea-
surement Toolkit (USIM Toolkit), a set of integrity
measurement collection tools capable of detecting ad-
vanced malware threats, such as memory-only im-
plants, that evade many traditional detection tools.
Userspace integrity measurement validates that a
platform is free from subversion by validating that
the current state of the platform is consistent with
a set of invariants. The invariants enforced by the
USIM Toolkit are carefully chosen based on the ex-
pected behavior of userspace, and key behaviors of
advanced malware. Userspace integrity measure-
ment may be combined with existing filesystem and
kernel integrity measurement approaches to provide
stronger guarantees that a platform is executing the
expected software and that the software is in an ex-
pected state.
1 Introduction
Modern malware often relies on subtle subversions
of the runtime environment of userspace processes to
maintain an adversary’s foothold on victim systems.
These implants elude most traditional detection
mechanisms while providing a range of features such
as execution of arbitrary programs, bulk data trans-
fers, victim monitoring, network discovery, persistent
storage, proxied communications, and command and
control. In particular, memory-only implants are able
to avoid many popular defensive technologies based
on filesystem scanning. The primary contribution of
this paper is the introduction of userspace integrity
measurement, an approach to filling this gap in mal-
ware defense, and the USIM Toolkit, an initial imple-
mentation of userspace integrity measurement with a
demonstrated ability to detect core techniques of ad-
vanced implants. Userspace integrity measurement is
based on a principled evaluation of the userspace ab-
stractions provided by an operating system and the
violations of these abstractions that allow implants
to operate outside the visibility of traditional system
monitoring tools.
1.1 Motivation
The motivation for this work is the conviction that
memory-only implants are active in the wild and of-
ten undetected. Memory-only attacks in general are
becoming prevalent [8,45,46] and go by many names:
advanced volatile threat, fileless, living off the land,
malware-free, memory-only, and non-malware. While
detection and reporting of such attacks is increas-
ing, the most notable report of a memory-only im-
plant may be Georg Wicherski’s talk at SyScan 2014
about Procedure Linkage Table (PLT) infections and
Evanescent Bat [44].
Evanescent Bat was an intrusion into a large Euro-
pean IT company in mid-2013 in which many Linux
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servers were compromised. The adversary injected
a memory-only implant into running processes from
the post-exploitation shell that infected the PLT of
those processes. The implant was highly sophisti-
cated: it used gcc plugins to scrub local variables
as they went out of scope and to encrypt global and
heap variables, in addition to handling many different
PLT implementations and corner cases. The intru-
sion went undetected until the adversarial operators
mistakenly revealed their presence and the implant.
1.2 Approach
Userspace integrity measurement and appraisal is the
process of collecting evidence of the current state
of the basic abstractions provided by an operating
system, and evaluating this evidence for violations
of invariants that indicate deviations from expected
runtime behavior. The primary abstractions we con-
sider are namespaces, filesystems, networking and
inter-process communication channels, environment
variables, virtual memory management, and runtime
linker/loaders. Implants take advantage of subtle
divergences between application developers’ under-
standings of these abstractions and the actual behav-
ior of the operating system. These divergences may
be caused by errors in the operating system imple-
mentation, ambiguities in the specification, or mis-
understandings by the application developers. The
premise of userspace measurement is that these im-
plant behaviors create observable effects in the point-
in-time state of an infected system that are unlikely
to be caused by benign software.
This paper introduces and evaluates the USIM
Toolkit as a proof-of-concept implementation for
userspace integrity measurement targeting the
GNU/Linux operating system. Section 2 defines
userspace and describes our heuristics for including
data as part of userspace integrity measurement. Sec-
tion 3 describes the adversary model considered di-
rectly by userspace integrity measurement, and how
the USIM Toolkit can be combined with other mea-
surements to protect against more powerful adver-
saries. Section 4 describes a range of known im-
plant techniques and how they are likely to impact
userspace. Section 5 describes the specific mea-
surement and appraisal capabilities currently imple-
mented in the USIM Toolkit. Section 6 evaluates the
USIM Toolkit’s ability to detect proof-of-concept im-
plementations illustrating the techniques of Section
4, and gives initial performance benchmarks for the
USIM Toolkit. Section 7 considers our approach in
the context of the large body of existing work combat-
ing malware. Section 8 describes the primary limita-
tions and areas for future work in the current USIM
Toolkit implementation. Section 9 summarizes our
approach to userspace measurement and the primary
contributions of this paper.
2 What Is Userspace
Userspace is everything, aside from the executing
kernel, that is needed for the system to run, per-
sist across reboots, and correctly perform operations
on behalf of the user. A complete userspace in-
tegrity measurement should reflect the security rel-
evant state of all aspects of a system other than the
kernel itself. Rather than attempt to produce such
a measurement, we focus on providing a core set
of measurement tools aimed at bootstrapping trust
from a kernel measurement to the underlying run-
time provided for all processes on a system.
Userspace refers to those aspects of a computer sys-
tem that are built using abstractions provided by an
operating system’s kernel. The exact features and
mechanisms of userspace may vary from system to
system. From an attacker’s perspective, userspace
provides a rich set of opportunities to cause the sys-
tem to diverge from correct operation without requir-
ing direct modification of the kernel. An expansive
approach to userspace measurement would reveal this
variety of compromises by examining all elements of
userspace, recording their attributes and interrela-
tionships, and appraising these measurements against
expected values for the system. Such a measurement
would reflect
• The complete memory state of every executing
process, including application specific data and
common process runtime structures
• Inter-process communication mechanisms in-
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cluding network state, shared memory regions,
files opened by processes, and pipes
• The complete state of the file system including
all subtrees, executable images, system libraries,
data files, and program configurations
• Configuration data needed for system adminis-
tration, including user accounts and application
specific configuration semantics such as a web-
server’s configuration file
• The set of configured devices and how they are
exposed (e.g., via the /dev virtual filesystem)
• Policy configurations used for access control,
network management, boot-time process execu-
tion, or other system services
• The state of kernel-level data reflecting the cur-
rent configuration of the system such as date
and time information, process privileges, mem-
ory maps, namespaces
Such a measurement would be extremely challeng-
ing both to collect and to verify. It would likely be ex-
tremely large and depend on significant application-
specific knowledge to reflect the internal data of the
processes that happen to be running on a given sys-
tem. Thus, our definition of userspace integrity mea-
surement is narrower than this. Rather than reflect
all aspects of userspace in a single measurement, we
focus on capturing the dynamic state of the common
runtime environment. Which data we include in the
userspace integrity measurement is based on the fol-
lowing heuristics:
• Include: Well-formedness conditions that apply
to all processes executing on a system should be
verifiable based on userspace measurement.
• Include: The current relationships between
executing processes should be reflected in
userspace measurement.
• Include: The values of kernel-level data struc-
tures that directly govern how processes inter-
act with system resources should be reflected in
userspace measurement.
• Include: Cryptographic hashes of critical sys-
tem files that must maintain bit-for-bit equality
with a trusted baseline for correct system oper-
ation should be included in userspace measure-
ment. This includes system executables, shared
libraries, and some configuration files.
• Exclude: Well-formedness of kernel-level data
structures should not be reflected in userspace
integrity measurement.
• Exclude: Application-specific semantics are
best verified by application-specific measure-
ments and thus should not be included in the
generic userspace integrity measurement.
For example, we include measurements of the PLTs
of running processes as part of userspace integrity
measurement, but exclude the content of data struc-
tures within a process’s runtime heap. The correct-
ness of the PLT is core to what it means to be a
well-formed process, while the semantics of the data
held inside the process heap is application specific
and excluded from our measurement. Similarly, data
maintained by the kernel that define the privileges of
processes, such as the user id associated with each
process, should be included in userspace measure-
ment, but the details of how these data are stored
in the kernel, e.g., the tree of struct task struct
instances maintained by the Linux kernel, should not.
This approach leads to a model for userspace in-
tegrity that supports the detection the kinds of ad-
vanced malware threats described in Section 1.1,
but does not present the technical and adminsitra-
tive challenges of representing the allowable internal
states of all programs that may be present on a sys-
tem.
3 Adversary Model
Userspace measurement targets an adversary that is
able to arbitrarily modify the memory of any normal
system process but is unable to modify the USIM
Toolkit or its trusted computing base. In particular,
the adversary is unable to corrupt the operating sys-
tem kernel hosting both the measurement tools and
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the victim processes. In existing systems, most ad-
versaries capable of modifying arbitrary processes are
likely to be able to also modify the measurement tools
or operating system kernel. To protect against real-
istic adversaries our approach relies on the concept
of nested measurements and isolated execution envi-
ronments provided by a measurement and attestation
system such as Maat [25].
Conversely, the adversaries considered by the
USIM Toolkit could employ application-specific im-
plants to meet their goals. For example, an im-
plant could modify function pointers defined by a
particular network service daemon in order to main-
tain a presence on a system. Such an implant
would not be detected by the USIM Toolkit, be-
cause the USIM Toolkit does not inspect applica-
tion specific data. Detection of such an attack would
require application-specific measurement in addition
to userspace, kernel, and lower-level measurements.
While we believe there is ample opportunity for de-
veloping measurement strategies capable of verify-
ing application-specific properties, (a) these measure-
ments would rely on the guarantees provided by a
system like the USIM Toolkit, and (b) mitigating the
more general attack classes should be higher prior-
ity as they tend to provide greater robustness and
portability for the adversary.
The key to generalizing userspace integrity mea-
surement to more interesting classes of adversaries is
the ability of one measurement to provide evidence
that another measurement was correctly performed.
For example, a measurement capability built into
the OS kernel can provide evidence that the USIM
Toolkit is correctly installed and executed. Simi-
larly, a measurement capability such as the Linux
Kernel Integrity Measurer (LKIM) [21] may use vir-
tual machine introspection to provide evidence that
the kernel-level measurement capability is reliable.
Each measurement in the chain supports trust in
the measurements above it. Ultimately, this chain
of measurements should be rooted in low-level cryp-
tographic guarantees such as those provided by the
trusted boot process and trusted platform module
[10,22]. The formalization of protocols for specifying
appropriate chains of measurements for a given use
case is an area of ongoing research [27] which could
also be leveraged by implementations of the USIM
Toolkit to guarantee integrity.
4 Implant Techniques
All implants have the fundamental goal of providing
an adversary stealthy access to a victim system. In-
herent in achieving this goal is the requirement for
execution. An implant that cannot execute cannot
serve its purpose. Implants may satisfy this require-
ment using various techniques that we divide into two
categories: simple and sophisticated.
Simple techniques rely on “hiding in plain sight” to
evade detection. They use system interfaces in a gen-
erally expected way to a nefarious end and succeed
when users and administrators fail to carefully exam-
ine the primary state of the system (e.g., processes
running and files on the file system). Such techniques
include replacing system binaries with malicious bi-
naries, file infections, and more generally file mod-
ifications, and they fall under Joanna Rutkowska’s
type 0 malware classification [28]. These techniques
are uninteresting in this context because they have
been well studied [5] and may be detected by file in-
tegrity checkers (e.g. IMA and Tripwire) or other se-
curity and system auditing tools, including antivirus
software.
Sophisticated techniques use system interfaces in
unusual ways to evade detection. These techniques
go undetected without deeper examination of the pri-
mary state of the system and fall under Rutkowska’s
type I and type II malware classifications [28]. It is
impossible to anticipate all conceivable techniques in
this category, but we have identified some common
techniques implants may use to achieve execution.
We also chose to examine a relatively new technique
for concealment and a privileged resource acquisition
technique that may facilitate communication. The
techniques are
• Process Text Segment Modification
• Global Offset Table/Procedure Linkage Table
Hooking
• Shared Object Injection
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• Thread Injection
• Namespace Manipulation
• File Descriptor Passing
These techniques cover a core set of userspace ef-
fects the USIM Toolkit needs to be able to detect
and distinguish from benign system behavior in or-
der to detect an implant. The first three are common
userland rootkit techniques that abuse existing pro-
cesses [41, Chapter 25] to achieve execution. Thread
injection has some overlap with those techniques (i.e.,
it may be achieved using any of the previous three),
but has a distinct effect on userspace. Namespace
manipulation is a relatively new means of achieving
stealth that may become increasingly relevant as con-
tainers become more common [11]. File descriptor
passing is a long-standing feature of UNIX domain
sockets that may enable an implant to acquire or
transfer privileged resource access. Our understand-
ing of these techniques directly informed the prioriti-
zation of measurements included in the initial imple-
mentation of the USIM Toolkit.
4.1 Process Text Segment Modifica-
tion
Text segment modification is one of the simplest ap-
proaches an implant can take to maintaining execu-
tion within a legitimate process. For most programs,
executable code is mapped directly into the process
memory space from the “.text” sections of the pro-
gram binary and supporting shared libraries. Notable
counter-examples to this rule are the Procedure Link-
age Tables (PLTs) of dynamically linked processes
that are generated by the runtime linker/loader (dis-
cussed below in Section 4.2), and just-in-time com-
piled code that is generated by many interpreters in
dynamically allocated heap buffers. Modifying exe-
cutable code in place gives the implant all the per-
missions of the host process, allows the implant to
intercept communications intended for the host pro-
cess, and evades some basic detection approaches by
not creating new executable memory regions.
By default most programs’ load segments are
marked as executable/non-writeable. This causes the
runtime loader to request that the operating system
map these regions without the writable bit set in the
corresponding page table entries, which will prevent
an implant from na¨ıvely attempting to overwrite a
process’s code. Many implants overcome this lim-
itation by employing a code-reuse attack, such as
Return-oriented Programming (ROP) [31], to remap
part of the text segment then inject and jump to the
implant payload. For consistency, the payload should
then remap the region as non-writable before enter-
ing its main program (although not all implants are
this careful).
This approach is observable, even after the fact, be-
cause it modifies memory pages that should be iden-
tical to the on-disk representation in the program bi-
nary. Given the on-disk binaries of the program and
all of its shared object dependencies, a simple com-
parison with process memory reveals any modifica-
tions [41, Chapter 25].
4.2 GOT/PLT Hooking
The Global Offset Table (GOT) and Procedure Link-
age Table (PLT) are structures created by the run-
time linker/loader that can be manipulated by mal-
ware to provide execution in a victim process with-
out modifying the text segment. Both the PLT and
the GOT support dynamic library linking and posi-
tion independent code (PIC) [38]. The GOT holds
the runtime addresses of global data and functions
that may not be known at compile time. The PLT
holds executable code used to make external function
calls via the GOT. Depending on how the program is
linked, the GOT will be populated with the correct
function addresses either at program load time or on
the first invocation of each function. Figure 1 shows
how the PLT and GOT are used for late binding of
calls. (1) The program code calls into the PLT, (2)
the PLT jumps to the address stored in the GOT. If
the function’s address hasn’t been resolved yet, then
(3) the address in the GOT is the next instruction
in the PLT (after the instruction that just jumped
into the GOT). (4) The PLT entry pushes informa-
tion about the call target onto the stack, then (5)
jumps to the zeroth entry in the PLT to invoke the
dynamic linker. The dynamic linker resolves the ad-
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dress of the desired function, stores it in the GOT,
and executes the function.
GOT
[N]: plt[M] +  6
...
...
...
PLT
PLT[M]:
    jmp *got[func]
    push reloc_index
    jmp plt[0]
PLT[0]: jmp linker
Program
Code (.text)
...
call func@plt
...
(2)
(3)
(4)
(1)
Figure 1: Function call symbol resolution using the
Global Offset Table (GOT) and Procedure Linkage
Table (PLT).
Implants with the ability to modify a process’s
GOT or PLT can easily redirect all invocations of
a shared library function to trigger a function in an
executable region controlled by the attacker.
These techniques are slightly harder to detect than
direct modifications to a process’s text section be-
cause the PLT and GOT values may be unique per
execution of a program. On the Intel architecture
PLTs reside in a shared text segment [38], so detect-
ing a PLT hook is equivalent to detecting a text seg-
ment modification. The GOT, however, is populated
at load or run time, but its contents are predictable
given the base load addresses of the process’s seg-
ments. A procedure for detecting some GOT over-
writes has already been established for memory foren-
sics [41, Chapter 25].
4.3 Shared Object Injection
Programs that support a plugin API often include
the ability to load arbitrary shared object files to ex-
tend their built-in functionality. This can be directly
exploited by implant authors to introduce malicious
functionality into a process. Shared object injection
is not strictly memory-only; it generally requires cre-
ation of a file in the filesystem. Thus, implants based
on shared object injections can be detected by hash-
ing the images of files as they are mapped (as Linux’s
Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) does). In
the unlikely event that shared objection injection at-
tacks are possible without modifying the filesystem
in a detectable way, these attacks are also detectable
by validating the set of files mapped by each process.
Pre-loading implants are a common special case of
shared object injection. The runtime linker/loader
supports specification of extra shared libraries that
should be mapped into every process based on the
LD PRELOAD environment variable or the contents of
/etc/ld.so.preload. By setting this variable, an
attacker can cause their implant to be mapped into
arbitrary processes.
4.4 Thread Injection
Given the ability to run arbitrary code in a process,
it’s trivial for an attacker to spawn a new thread via
the clone system call. This provides stealthy exe-
cution and gives the implant ongoing access to the
victim process’s resources.
A maliciously injected thread of this nature is dif-
ficult to detect because multi-threaded programs are
common and threads don’t carry state explaining
their genesis. However the code used to spawn the
thread may reside in a suspicious memory mapping
(e.g., one with both writeable and executable permis-
sions or one that is anonymous and executable) or
the thread may execute code in a suspicious memory
mapping.
4.5 Namespace Manipulation
Namespaces provide isolation between processes with
respect to a global system resource. If two processes
are in different namespaces, they are invisible to each
other with respect to the associated resource. This
feature is commonly used as a form of lightweight
virtualization called containers [32]. An adversary
can achieve stealthy execution by running an implant
in different namespaces from the rest of the system.
The Horse Pill rootkit [20] implements this names-
pace isolation by installing a custom initial RAM disk
(initrd) image that executes the rootkit functional-
ity in the default namespaces and creates separate
namespaces for the normal system boot process [37].
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A namespace is identified by its type and inode
number. These inode numbers begin at hard-coded
default values that are distinct for each namespace
type. If the init or systemd process has non-default
namespace inode numbers, then there may be pro-
cesses operating in different namespaces, outside the
purview of most of the userspace processes.
4.6 File Descriptor Passing
File descriptors can be passed between processes us-
ing UNIX domain sockets via ancillary data [34,
Chapter 17]. As such, an attacker could inject into a
process and copy or send file descriptors to other pro-
cesses. This could be used to bypass a firewall or port
binding restrictions (e.g., requiring superuser privi-
leges to bind well-known ports) or more generally to
bypass access controls on any kernel abstraction with
a file interface.
As with thread injection there is nothing inherent
to file descriptors that could indicate malicious ori-
gins, but peripheral artifacts may enable detection.
For example if a file has attributes indicating only the
root user can access it, we do not expect a non-root
process to possess a file descriptor for that file. Simi-
larly we might not expect a process without superuser
privileges to have a TCP or UDP socket bound to a
well-known port. More generally a process should
not have file descriptors for objects unless the pro-
cess meets the access requirements for those objects.
Any deviation from this expectation is suspect. Ad-
ditionally the code that passed the file descriptor may
reside in a suspicious memory mapping in either the
sending or receiving process or in both.
5 Implementation
The USIM Toolkit consists of two components that
work together to evaluate the integrity of userspace.
The first component is a collection agent which gath-
ers point-in-time information on both global and per-
process system state. Specifically it collects
• System information: operating system, architec-
ture, network name, and software inventory as
reported by the native package manager
• Hashes of various important files on the system
• Meta-data for each process on the system
• Memory mappings, including permissions, ad-
dresses, and backing files and offsets for root-
owned processes
• Namespaces in use on the system, and a map of
which processes belong to which namespace
• The number, type, and owning process of each
open file descriptor in all root-owned processes
• Per-process relocations (i.e. GOT/PLT entries)
for each root-owned process
• Hashes of each executable memory segment cur-
rently mapped in a root-owned process
The choice to focus on root-owned processes is in-
tended to limit the performance impact of the USIM
Toolkit while providing adequate detection capabili-
ties. This is a configuration option that can be triv-
ially changed to include measurement of all, or an
expanded subset of, processes. The USIM Toolkit is
designed to be extensible, we expect to incorporate
additional tools for measuring new aspects of system
state.
The collected information is gathered into a sin-
gle graph-based data structure which captures the
complex relationship between the individual data. A
graph also allows for multiple collection agents to col-
lect different sets of data in parallel, optionally with
different permissions. The collection agent then bun-
dles this “measurement graph” into a portable for-
mat for evaluation. An example subgraph showing
memory-mapped regions of a process is shown in Fig-
ure 2.
The second USIM Toolkit component, called the
appraiser, evaluates the measurement graph to ap-
praise the integrity of userspace. The appraiser ex-
tracts data and relations and evaluates the measure-
ment based on a set of rules in a policy defined by an
administrator. The number and complexity of these
rules is limited only by the resources and data avail-
able to appraise. For this evaluation, our implemen-
tation defines the following set of rules
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Figure 2: Example measurement graph subgraph
showing the relationship between processes, process
memory mappings, file memory mappings, and files.
Shaded nodes can be used by multiple processes,
while unshaded ones are unique to each process.
1. Only a defined subset of programs can have
memory mappings that are both writable and
executable (a whitelist)
2. Only a defined subset of programs can arbitrarily
have file-backed executable memory mappings
that do not correspond to a direct or transitive
dependency of the binary (a whitelist)
3. Only a defined subset of programs can have
anonymous executable memory mappings (a
whitelist)
4. The original executable for a process must be in
the file-backed mappings for the process
5. Read-only executable memory mappings for pro-
cesses should hash to the same values as the re-
spective sections of the associated on-disk files
6. The init or systemd process that is the ultimate
parent of all other processes should be in the
default PID namespace
7. Resolved GOT entries should not change (e.g.,
the resolved address of printf should not
change across snapshots once it has been re-
solved)
8. A socket in use by one processes should not later
be used in a different, non-child process
The USIM appraiser determines whether the col-
lected data conforms to the defined policy and alerts
the administrator with the result. Separating the col-
lection component from the appraisal piece achieves
two goals: 1) adherence to the principle of least priv-
ilege: while the collection agent(s) may require ele-
vated privileges to collect data, the evaluation com-
ponent often does not; and 2) flexibility: the two
components can be executed on separate machines,
and additional appraisal constraints can easily be
added to more tightly confine the allowable states
of the measured platform. Indeed, it is envisioned
that in most scenarios the USIM evaluator compo-
nent will be run on a remote appraisal server, with
only the collection agent running on the client.
Although it should be possible to examine all of
a process’s GOT entries and ascertain whether they
point to reasonable locations, that was beyond the
scope of this work. For our purposes it was sufficient
to record GOT entries and manually detect changes
across snapshots. This does limit the utility of our
approach to catching a GOT infection as it happens
rather than detecting any GOT infection, but this
was reasonable for our needs. A more thorough dy-
namic linking integrity verification could simulate the
dynamic linker’s load procedure, using the on-disk
binary files, to verify that all observed entries match
the expected value.
Several of our appraisal rules use whitelists to
broaden applicability to a wider set of scenarios. For
example interpreters, such as Python, Java, and web
browsers, often have benign anonymous executable
memory mappings or memory mappings that are
both writable and executable. To accommodate these
cases, we relax those rules and adopt a whitelist
to provide flexibility. Additionally, some programs
dynamically load plugins which are not explicitly
listed as dependencies (e.g. apache2), and we ad-
dress this by using another whitelist. For this work
we na¨ıvely whitelisted by binary executable name,
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and the whitelists were not implemented in the USIM
Toolkit. Rather the USIM Toolkit reports the suspi-
cious observations and the onus is on the administra-
tor to render the final appraisal decision.
We implemented both components of the USIM
Toolkit using plain C99 language constructs with
minimal external library dependencies. The collec-
tion agent is implemented as a collection of separate
programs that are executed by a central control pro-
cess. This allows each program to be run with a min-
imal set of privileges (e.g., the file hashing program
does not require the ability to read arbitrary process’s
memory). The USIM Toolkit targets the GNU/Linux
operating system, but could likely be retargeted to
other operating systems by porting the relevant col-
lection subprograms.
Rules 7 and 8 also require access to previous mea-
surements to identify changes over time. As of this
writing, our implementation is not yet able to auto-
matically compare current results to previous results,
but the feature is in progress. Therefore, in this pa-
per, we manually verify successive reports to verify
those parts of policy. While not ideal, the fact that
such verification can be done with the collected in-
formation is sufficient to evaluate the utility of the
USIM Toolkit.
6 Evaluation
Security solutions must be capable of detecting mali-
cious activities without imposing unacceptable per-
formance overhead. This section presents a func-
tional evaluation of the USIM Toolkit based on its
ability to detect proof-of-concept implementations of
the implant techniques described in Section 4, and
initial benchmarks of the performance overhead of
the USIM Toolkit.
6.1 Functional Evaluation
To evaluate the effectiveness of the USIM Toolkit
in detecting common implant techniques, we imple-
mented representative samples of the techniques de-
scribed in Section 4 and observed the detection capa-
bility of the USIM Toolkit. Our original goal was to
evaluate the USIM Toolkit against implant samples
collected from the Internet. Unfortunately, running
such an evaluation against real implants is extremely
challenging because (a) implants may be highly tuned
to a specific runtime environment and command and
control system that is difficult to replicate in a lab
environment, (b) running real implants even in a
controlled environment risks an outbreak that could
damage operational networks, and (c) individual im-
plants may combine multiple known and unknown
techniques which makes it difficult to test specific de-
tection hypotheses. Based on these limitations, we
opted to develop clean-room implementations of spe-
cific implant techniques and test detection of these
samples instead. We used open-source implementa-
tions for any techniques where straightforward im-
plementations with no additional functionality were
readily available. Notably for process text segment
modification and namespace manipulation we used
Modern Userland Exec [12] and Horse Pill [20], re-
spectively.
The USIM Toolkit is not intended to detect ini-
tial process exploitation. Accordingly, our implant
samples do not include first stage exploit capabilities
such as buffer overflows or ROP chains. The sam-
ples are simple C programs that each demonstrate a
particular technique, excepting the two open-source
samples. The narrow scope of each sample made it
simple to isolate and test detection of the implant be-
havior under consideration. For similar reasons, we
also disabled the built-in exploit mitigation functions
such as address space layout randomization, stack ca-
naries, W ⊕X memory protections, and the SELinux
mandatory access control system. These mechanisms
are an important part of host defenses, but measure-
ment systems like the USIM Toolkit provide an im-
portant fallback to detect when protections fail.
6.1.1 Process Text Segment Modification
We used the open-source tool Modern Userland Exec
[12] to evaluate text segment modification. This tool
is especially interesting because instead of merely
modifying part of the text segment, it mimics the
execve system call and completely replaces the orig-
inal process’s text segment with that of another bi-
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Implant Class Rules Triggered
Text Segment Mod 1, 4, 5
GOT/PLT Hooking 7
Shared Object Injection 2
Thread Injection 1, 3, 4
Namespace Manipulation 6
FD Passing 8
Table 1: Summary of effectiveness against each class
of implants, as well as whether other known tech-
niques would catch the implant.
nary. However, unlike execve, this is done with
anonymous memory mappings and without causing
changes to most of the kernel’s information about
the process (e.g., /proc/[pid]/exe). This allows one
program to masquerade as another.
The USIM Toolkit appraiser alerted on this pro-
cess for two reasons: 1) the process had anonymous
executable memory mappings and the program is not
on the whitelist of interpreters, and 2) the initial ex-
ecutable was missing from the file-backed mappings.
6.1.2 GOT/PLT Hooking
We evaluated GOT and PLT hooking by authoring a
simple C program that prompts the user for a com-
mand. The user supplies either “got” or “plt” and
then an address. For the “got” command, the ad-
dress is the address of the GOT entry for xstat,
and the program overwrites that entry with the ad-
dress of a malicious function. Then the program calls
stat to demonstrate the hook.
For the “plt” command, the user-supplied address
is the address of the PLT entry for lxstat, and
the program uses mprotect to make that page of
memory writable, overwrites the first instruction of
that PLT entry with a call to a malicious function,
and then uses mprotect to make the page read-only
again. This solution is less portable than the GOT so-
lution because it relies on the first instruction at that
PLT address being a 6-byte jump and overwrites it
with a 5-byte call to a malicious function and a 1-byte
no-op. This also has the side effect of forcing the dy-
namic linker to resolve the address of lxstat every
time lstat is called. The program then calls lstat
to demonstrate the hook.
This program requires disabling RELocation Read-
Only (RELRO) [17]. Otherwise the GOT would be
unwritable, preventing our GOT hook, and the dy-
namic linker’s reserved GOT entries would be zeroed
out, causing our PLT hook to crash the program. Our
PLT hooking technique was to overwrite the jump
instruction with a function call and a no-op in or-
der to call our malicious function and then rely on
the PLT’s symbol resolution to execute the intended
function. This symbol resolution involves jumping to
the address stored in the third entry of the GOT,
which would normally be the address of the dynamic
linker’s symbol resolution function. However on our
Ubuntu 17.10 system, RELRO binaries are missing
the .got.plt section and the second and third en-
tries of the GOT are zeroed out. Thus, jumping to
the address in the third GOT entry causes a segmen-
tation fault. More sophisticated GOT and PLT hooks
could easily bypass this defense mechanism by mak-
ing the GOT writeable before writing to it (and then
making it read-only again for stealth) and by using
a PLT hook that preserves the PLT’s behavior (i.e.
jumping to the address in the GOT and triggering
symbol resolution if the symbol hasn’t been resolved
yet).
The USIM Toolkit appraiser detected the GOT
modification via resolving each relocation both before
and after the infection, and noting the change. In our
case, the GOT entry for lxstat pointed to the bi-
nary’s text segment mapping rather than a mapping
to libc. Similarly, the appraiser detected the PLT
modification because the hash of that memory map-
ping no longer matched its on-disk representation in
the binary, as well as detecting that change in relo-
cation value from before the infection.
6.1.3 Shared Object Injection
For shared object injection, we composed a simple C
program that takes the path to a shared object and
the name of its entry point symbol, calls dlopen to
load the shared object, uses dlsym to find the entry
point, and then calls the entry point.
The loaded shared object was not one of the bi-
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nary’s dependencies, and was located outside of the
normal library paths. The USIM Toolkit appraiser
detected this, as this binary was not whitelisted to
allow arbitrary loading of shared objects.
6.1.4 Thread Injection
We achieved thread injection via shellcode that uses
the clone system call to create a new thread whose
entry point is elsewhere in the shellcode. We fed the
shellcode to a simple program that reads network
data into a buffer, marks the buffer as executable,
and calls into it. We wrote the shellcode in x86 64
assembly that we adapted from an open-source ex-
ample [43].
While the USIM Toolkit appraiser had no way of
knowing how many threads each process should have,
it was able to notice that the parasite thread was ex-
ecuting code in an anonymous executable mapping,
which our restrictive appraisal policy forbids for pro-
cesses not in the whitelist, so the system failed ap-
praisal.
6.1.5 Namespace Manipulation
We used Horse Pill [20], an open-source implementa-
tion of a custom initrd, to evaluate namespace manip-
ulation. The custom initrd has a malicious run-init
that compromises a system on boot. The modified
run-init migrates most of the system to a new PID
namespace, makes fake kernel thread processes in
that namespace, and runs a backdoor outside the
namespace.
Even running within Horse Pill’s infection names-
pace, the USIM Toolkit was able to gather sufficient
evidence to cause the appraisal to fail because the
init process’s namespace is not the expected default.
Also, the total number of namespaces on the system
differed from the expected value.
6.1.6 File Descriptor Passing
To evaluate file descriptor passing, we authored a
simple C program that accepts a TCP connection
and sends it to another process via UNIX domain
socket.
Two subsequent USIM Toolkit measurements
showed the same socket file descriptor was open by
one process in the first measurement, and another
process in the second measurement. Manual inspec-
tion showed that the information was present to ac-
curately identify and fail the second appraisal.
6.2 Performance Evaluation
We measured the performance overhead of the USIM
Toolkit by performing complete measurements of (a)
a freshly booted minimal CentOS 7 virtual machine,
(b) A CentOS 7 VM under a synthetic load of bench-
marking redis server performance while simultane-
ously compiling a Linux kernel, and (c) a typical
Ubuntu 17.10 user desktop system after days of typi-
cal user activity (web browsing, email, etc). Systems
(a) and (b) are virtual machines using the KVM hy-
pervisor on system (c), with 4 virtual CPUs and 4
GB of memory assigned to them, while system (c) is
a Dell Latitude E7450 laptop with 16GB of memory
and an Intel i7-5600U CPU running at 2.6 Ghz. All
appraisals were processed on the Dell E7450 laptop.
For each case we collected the total CPU time,
peak CPU usage, peak memory usage, and network
data transferred. Table 2 lists average values over 10
runs for these each of the three test scenarios.
We also measured the effect of measurement on the
performance of a system under heavy load. We col-
lected benchmark data from the redis-benchmark
tool on an idle CentOS 7 VM with 4 vCPUs, the Cen-
tOS 7 VM while compiling the Linux kernel with make
-j4 with an allyesconfig configuration, and when tak-
ing a USIM measurement with the above load. This
load ensured that the system was handling heavy
disk, CPU, memory, and network load at the time of
measurment. We repeated the benchmark 12 times
for each condition and computed the averages by
throwing away the max and minimum results and
averaging the remaining 10 for each redis benchmark
subtest. The results of this experiment are shown in
Table 3.
These results show a significant impact of our un-
optimized protoype on the Redis benchmark in iso-
lation. Initial tests on an otherwise idle system
show on average 28% less performance when taking
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CentOS 7
(VM, Idle)
CentOS 7
(VM, Load)
Ubuntu 17.10
(HW, Desktop)
Graph Nodes 6275 6750 14804
Graph Edges 27837 30275 14804
Total Size (MB) 12.5 13.3 30.3
Processes 123 151 341
Root-Owned Processes 27 47 54
Collection Time (s) 199 606 255
Per-Process Time (s) 7.5 16 4.6
Peak CPU Usage (%) 100 100 100
Peak Mem Usage (MB) 67 67 80
Appraisal Time (s) 649 1575 1594
Table 2: USIM measurement metrics in three test scenarios. Average of 10 measurements.
Redis benchmark Idle USIM Delta Load Load+USIM Delta
(% of Idle) (% of Idle) (Idle-USIM) (% of Idle) (% of Idle) (Load -
(Load+USIM))
GET 100.00 74.42 25.58 30.97 23.66 7.30
HSET 100.00 72.89 27.11 29.01 20.40 8.61
INCR 100.00 73.12 26.88 31.09 21.95 9.14
LPOP 100.00 71.37 28.63 29.19 22.44 6.75
LPUSH 100.00 71.87 28.13 29.53 23.42 6.12
LRANGE 100 100.00 72.27 27.73 28.88 22.56 6.32
LRANGE 300 100.00 68.45 31.55 26.38 20.25 6.13
LRANGE 500 100.00 75.82 24.18 30.99 23.70 7.28
LRANGE 600 100.00 70.72 29.28 30.93 23.90 7.03
MSET (10 keys) 100.00 69.41 30.59 31.70 24.47 7.23
PING BULK 100.00 64.88 35.12 26.52 19.50 7.02
PING INLINE 100.00 75.69 24.31 32.33 24.20 8.13
RPOP 100.00 74.72 25.28 33.36 24.87 8.48
RPUSH 100.00 73.46 26.54 30.17 23.32 6.86
SADD 100.00 72.85 27.15 29.38 21.98 7.40
SET 100.00 74.69 25.31 28.84 19.86 8.98
SPOP 100.00 74.11 25.89 30.50 22.26 8.24
Avg 100.00 72.40 27.60 29.99 22.51 7.47
Table 3: Redis benchmark performance degradataion attributable to the USIM Toolkit relative to an idle
system (larger is better)
a measurement. However, when the system is under
stress from another workload, the additional impact
of USIM on the original benchmark is only 8%. The
significantly lower impact on the loaded score sug-
gests that much of the performance impact of mea-
surement is related to running any task in addition
to the benchmark suite.
While some impact on the system is unavoidable,
these benchmarks suggest that significant work is
needed to reduce the performance impact of the
USIM Toolkit. Implementing local evaluation checks
to limit the amount of data that must be cached and
sent to the appraiser will likely greatly reduce the
peak memory usage and network IO of the USIM
Toolkit. When implementing the USIM Toolkit, we
paid little attention to performance optimization, so
many implementation optimizations are likely avail-
able that would reduce the CPU time and memory
required.
7 Related Work
Computer defense has long been a “cat and mouse
game” in which attackers continually discover and de-
ploy new mechanisms for exploiting and controlling
their victims, and defenders respond by developing
counter measures to prevent exploitation or detect
the control mechanism. Defensive strategies include
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active mitigations, runtime integrity measurement,
and hardware-based trust mechanisms, as well as tra-
ditional antivirus and enterprise client management
tools. Defenders use these tools to attempt to pre-
vent adversaries from gaining access to systems, to
detect when a system has been compromised, and to
limit the effects a compromise might have on a single
host or across a network.
7.1 Active Mitigations
Many defensive measures, such as W ⊕ X [9] and
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [24],
introduce challenges to initial exploitation, but expe-
rience has shown that adversaries are able to work
around these mitigations, using techniques such as
memory disclosures, information side-channels, and
return-oriented programming [4, 6, 30, 31, 35], to in-
stall implants for long-term control. Operating sys-
tem controls such as access-control based sandbox-
ing [33, 40] and code signing attempt to mitigate
implants by limiting what executables can be run
from different security contexts, but various attacks
have shown that these too are circumvented by ad-
versaries [7, 18,42].
7.2 Measurement Agents
Integrity measurement tools attempt to detect im-
plants by attesting to the integrity of a system. A key
advantage for implant detection tools is that implants
intentionally have lasting effects on a victim platform
such as providing a command and control channel for
the adversary. Measurement tools, such as Linux’s
Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) [29], the
Linux Kernel Integrity Measurer (LKIM) [21], and
Semantic Integrity [26], attempt to identify these ef-
fects on either the filesystem or the runtime behavior
of processes. These existing integrity measurement
solutions have focused on pre-boot environments, the
operating system kernel, or file images. Userspace in-
tegrity measurement extends the concepts introduced
in these works to support verification of the next ab-
straction level in a modern system, the userspace
operating environment. Comprehensive system in-
tegrity measurement should include application-level
measurements, and runtime measurements of lower
platform levels such as the hypervisor or system man-
agement mode.
Dynamic Measurements LKIM [21] and Seman-
tic Integrity [26] are dynamic measurement tech-
niques that can measure kernel data structures at any
time during a platform’s execution. Like the USIM
Toolkit, these tools work by inspecting their target’s
runtime state to identify violations of key invariants
that may indicate compromise. Unlike the USIM
Toolkit, these tools focus on implants that operate
by modifying data structures in the kernel’s mem-
ory space. Combining these kernel integrity mea-
surement solutions with userspace integrity measure-
ment can significantly reduce the opportunities for
an implant to hide in a modern system. Filling in
the gaps, for example by adding measurement of the
USIM Toolkit to a kernel-level solution, is an impor-
tant area of future research.
Static Measurements Static measurement tools,
such as IMA and Cb Protection, attempt to guaran-
tee integrity by taking a cryptographic hash of files at
loadtime. IMA is functionality built into the Linux
kernel that performs cryptographic hashes of all, or
a configured subset of, files accessed by a system.
The log of these hashes can be reported to userspace
along with a certification of the current value using
a Trusted Platform Module (TPM). IMA builds on a
long history of file-hashing based approaches to sys-
tem integrity validation; TripWire [19] is the earliest
notable ancestor of IMA. IMA improves on historic
approaches primarily by (a) hashing files as they are
accessed, (b) performing the hash from within the op-
erating system kernel context, and (c) using a TPM
to endorse the hash log. To detect implants using a
system like IMA, a trusted system can compare the
reported log with either a blacklist of known implants
or a whitelist of approved files. Cb Protection from
Carbon Black [2] also provides load-time checks on
programs as they are launched in order to verify in-
tegrity at program start.
In environments, such as fixed-purpose embedded
systems, where a complete whitelist of valid files is
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tractable, static measurements can provide strong
guarantees that no implants are loaded from a sys-
tem’s filesystem. Unfortunately, most systems are
not amenable to complete whitelists, and creation of
a comprehensive blacklist of malware hashes is in-
feasible because new variants with new hashes are
trivially created by attackers. Further, memory-
only implants may not require loading any attacker-
modified files from the filesystem. This paper comple-
ments these approaches by extending integrity from
the filesystem to other key aspects of the userspace
runtime environment such as environment variables,
interprocess communication channels, and runtime
linker-loader behavior.
Root of Trust Confidence in measurement tools
requires a root of trust to guarantee that the measure-
ments are correctly collected and reported. In their
research, England et al. [13] describe an approach
to integrity measurement in which measurements are
cryptographic hashes of boot-time software. This ap-
proach is also used by the Trusted Computing Group
(TCG) as part of the “Trusted Boot” technology [10].
SecureBoot [3] also aims to provide a chain of in-
tegrity checks beginning at system power-on. These
checks are optimal for identifying persistant threats
on the platform, but are largely ineffective against
attacks that take place after startup. The work de-
scribed in this paper aims to extend this trusted base
to userspace software at runtime in order to more ef-
fectively guard against a wider range of attacks.
7.3 Antivirus
Integrity measurement attempts to enforce a set of
invariants to which any well-behaved system should
conform. Antivirus tools take the opposite approach,
defining specific static or behavioral signatures that
only malicious software should exhibit. The specific
techniques used by antivirus products are generally
proprietary, but most appear to be based on finger-
printing files and monitoring runtime process behav-
ior such as system call tracing [16,36]. Fingerprinting
files may be more resilient to variations than the pre-
cise cryptographic hashes used by IMA, but decades
of experience has shown that implant authors are able
to quickly adapt and deploy variants with previously
unknown signatures [23,47].
Behavioral profiling is another powerful tool that
has proven useful in recognizing many implants as
they are executing. Behavioral approaches are en-
hanced by the ability of antivirus vendors to collect
large scale data from across their customer base and
correlate newly observed behavior with historical in-
dicators of infections. This is most effective in de-
tecting broadly distributed implants that may trigger
other alerting systems such as network monitoring so-
lutions.
Some antivirus tools, such as Cb Defense [1] have
begun to use predictive modeling to identify when
a process is behaving suspiciously. However, as is
often the case in the arms race for cyber security,
researchers are already inventing ways to hide their
malicious behavior in the execution of benign pro-
cesses [15].
Enterprise Defense Enterprise defense frame-
works have similar goals to traditional antivirus tools,
but at a larger scale. These include Trusted Network
Connect (TNC) and SAMSON. Similar to the limi-
tations with antivirus tools, these frameworks have
a narrow focus and would generally not detect the
attacks evaluated in this paper. Specifically, TNC is
focused on attestation only within the scope of access
control [39], while SAMSON is designed to do remote
attestation of client systems using IMA logic to gauge
the integrity of programs running on the system [14].
Neither of these frameworks introduces novel mea-
surements capable of detecting the userspace attacks
targeted by this paper.
More recent enterprise defense products are in-
corporating integrity measurement-like functionality.
Forcepoint Threat Protection for Linux has claimed
success in detecting Horse Pill [37]. Now known as
Forcepoint Linux Security or Second Look, this tool
uses memory forensics to identify malicious software
on the system. The backend of this tool is propri-
etary; however, it seems to rely on comparing the
captured kernel memory image to a reference kernel,
and taking pagewise hashes of executables to com-
pare to known-good versions. These abilities would
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make it effective against some of the implant tech-
niques listed in this paper.
8 Future Work
The USIM Toolkit includes measurements of pro-
cess environments, runtime structures, and access
to OS resources. We evaluated these measurements
against proof-of-concept implementations of common
implant techniques to demonstrate that they are able
to reliably detect implants that may elude detec-
tion by traditional means. It is unlikely that these
measurements are comprehensive; continued study of
userspace invariants and how they are violated by
advanced malware is an important area of continued
research.
Performance evaluation of the USIM Toolkit
showed a significant performance impact, a full mea-
surement of an active system took over 200 seconds,
required 80 MB or more of memory, and transferred
20+ MB of data to a remote appraiser. We be-
lieve that USIM Toolkit prototype implementation
could be significantly optimized, the data collected
for the same measurements could be reduced, and
some local checks could be performed to minimize
the data transmitted to the remote appraiser. Imple-
menting these improvements in order to reduce the
performance overhead is important to ensure these
approaches are usable in practical contexts.
Userspace measurement is only one part of produc-
ing comprehensive integrity measurement of a mod-
ern platform. Prior work largely focuses on kernel-
level measurements. Future work may introduce
strategies for measurements of individual security-
critical applications and measurement of lower-level
components such as hypervisors. To fully benefit
from these components, significant additional work
must also be done to understand how measurements
can be combined to ensure that the correct appraisal
of a lower-level measurement justifies trust in higher-
level measurements.
9 Conclusion
This paper introduced the USIM Toolkit, an exten-
sible set of GNU/Linux measurement and appraisal
tools for verifying the integrity of userspace. We
have shown that this prototype is capable of detect-
ing a variety of sophisticated implant techniques. Al-
though work is needed to improve the toolkit’s com-
pleteness and performance, it is a general mecha-
nism to detect a broad class of integrity violations
with myriad security implications. Because the USIM
Toolkit is based on invariants of well-behaved sys-
tems, it is part of a workable integrity strategy that
requires no preknowledge of specific attacks. By com-
bining the USIM Toolkit with other integrity verifica-
tion techniques, trust could be extended from a root
of trust to the application level to form a comprehen-
sive verification solution. Even on its own the USIM
Toolkit is a critical advancement in the detection of
sophisticated in-memory userspace implants.
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